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Managing Complications in the  
Sino-Australian Economic Relationship 
Mark Beeson and Jeffrey D. Wilson1 
The ascent of China has irrevocably changed Australia’s external strategic environment.  While 
China became Australia’s top trading partner during the mid-2000s, tensions in the bilateral 
economic relationship have posed a series of complications for Australian policymakers.  In this 
article, we explore four areas where these complications have become salient: economic 
asymmetries, Chinese state capitalism, the so-called resource curse, and tensions with 
geopolitical imperatives.  We argue these demonstrate that China’s rise is not only a security 
challenge for Australia but also an economic one, which demands new strategies that are 
sensitive to the challenges and vulnerabilities of the Sino-Australian economic relationship. 
The rise of China is transforming Australia’s economic and strategic 
environment.  This may not be a novel observation, but what is less 
commonly acknowledged is just how integrated the economic and 
geopolitical consequences of China’s rise actually are.  While it has become 
commonplace to highlight the difficulty of managing Australia’s simultaneous 
economic and strategic reliance on competing great powers,2 less attention 
has been paid to the politically transformative impact of China’s growing 
material importance for Australia.  The simple reality is that China is exerting 
an increasingly powerful influence on both the structure of the Australian 
economy and the options available to policymakers: even the most 
committed of American allies now have to think twice about gratuitously 
irritating the Chinese.  Few doubt that in the event of conflict between the 
United States and China, Australia would side with the United States as it 
always has done.  But in relatively peaceful times the question of how to deal 
productively with China is a more difficult, sensitive and important task than 
before. 
In some ways Australia’s economic relationship with China is a re-run of the 
Japan-sponsored resource boom of the 1970s.3  The ‘China boom’ looks in 
                                                
1 This work was supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery project ‘The political 
economy of Australia-China relations’ (DP150100217). 
2 James Reilly, ‘Counting on China? Australia’s Strategic Response to Economic 
Interdependence’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, vol. 5, no. 4 (2012), pp. 369-94. 
3 John G. Crawford and Saburo Okita, Australia, Japan and Western Pacific Economic 
Relations: A Report to the Governments of Australia and Japan (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1976).  As one of the referees pointed out, there have been a 
series of other commodity booms in Australian history that display similar dynamics.  See, I. W. 
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danger of ending in precisely the same sort of way that its predecessor did, 
with major potential implications for Australia’s economic security.4  There is 
of course one important difference between the Japanese and Chinese 
experiences: like Australia, Japan was a close ally of the United States, 
rather than a potential strategic rival.  Moreover, even if the current trade 
relationship with China continues to expand, there are other aspects of 
Australia’s relationship with China that will prove challenging for 
policymakers.  The fact that China is a notionally communist country that 
practises a distinctive form of ‘state capitalism’ provides an additional layer 
of complexity, which exceeds even the notoriously opaque practices that 
were associated with Japan’s economic relationship with Australia.5  One 
thing the Chinese undoubtedly have in common with the Japanese, 
however, is a much more ‘comprehensive’ view of security issues and a 
lively appreciation of the interconnected nature of economic and strategic 
issues.6  It is one Australian policymakers would do well to recognise—if not 
emulate—if they are to respond to the challenge presented by China’s rise. 
The starting point for this analysis is the observation that China and Australia 
are in some ways unlikely partners united primarily by brute economic 
realities.  If Australian policymakers could freely choose with whom to have 
intimate economic relations, one suspects China—which carries the 
baggage of its emerging strategic rivalry with the United States—would not 
be top of the list.  The logic of ‘economic complementarity’ between the two 
countries, and the unforgiving geographical reality of China’s growing weight 
in the Asia-Pacific have compelled this unlikely union.  The question is: What 
will come of it and who will benefit?  
To begin to answer these questions, we explore the contours of the 
complications that Chinese economic ties are currently posing for Australian 
policymakers.  Four such complications are explored: the challenges posed 
by asymmetries in Sino-Australian trade, difficulties associated with Chinese 
state capitalism, the impacts of the so-called ‘resource curse’, and the 
geopolitically charged nature of bilateral economic relations.  We suggest 
that these complications—each of which is somewhat unique to the China 
relationship—are not only forcing a reappraisal of how Australia responds to 
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its external strategic environment, but are also reconfiguring internal 
considerations bearing upon economic policy choices.  They also mean that 
Australia’s process of ‘coming to terms’ with China will prove more 
challenging than its previous economic integration with Japan.  The Sino-
Australian relationship consequently provides a convenient window through 
which to examine the likely trajectory of the next phase in Australia’s political 
and economic turn towards the Asian region. 
Contextualising and  
Theorising Australia’s Asian Trade Links 
To understand the significance of Sino-Australian trade ties it is useful to 
provide some historical context.  There has been a long run ‘turn to Asia’ as 
a consequence of the declining importance of Australia’s imperial ties with 
Britain and the rapid industrialisation of Japan, Southeast Asia and China in 
the latter part of the twentieth century.7  The simple, inescapable—and for 
some, unpalatable—reality has been that East Asia’s growing economic 
importance left Australian policymakers with little alternative other than to 
come to terms with the region.8  Crucially, a region that had previously been 
synonymous with strategic threat was now seen as a major economic 
opportunity and the basis for Australia’s future prosperity. 
Nothing captured this change of mood—nor drove the subsequent policy 
shift that attempted to capitalise on it—more than Ross Garnaut’s 
commissioned analysis of Australia’s economic relations with Northeast Asia 
published in 1990.9  Two points are especially noteworthy about this report.  
First, at that time it was still Japan rather than China that was the centre of 
attention.  Second, Garnaut’s analysis was informed by the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics, of which he was one of Australia’s most influential 
and articulate advocates.  As a former advisor of then Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke, Garnaut’s views carried considerable weight, and his report provided 
a blueprint and rationale for Australia’s economic engagement with the 
region.  The guiding assumption was that Australian policymakers should 
liberalise and open up the economy and allow market forces to make the 
most of Australia’s complementary relationship with Asia: Australia’s 
comparative advantage in resource and commodity production would 
complement the demand from Asia’s rapidly industrialising economies. 
                                                
7 Sandra Tweedie, Trading Partners: Australia and Asia 1790-1993 (Sydney: UNSW Press, 
1994). 
8 Ann Capling, ‘Twenty Years of Australia’s Engagement with Asia’, The Pacific Review, vol. 21, 
no. 5 (2008), pp. 601-22. 
9 Ross Garnaut, Australia and the Northeast Ascendancy (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1990). 
Mark Beeson and Jeffrey D. Wilson 
- 24 - 
Garnaut’s views resonated and built on a more broadly based overhaul of 
Australia’s domestic and foreign relations.10  Many of these initiatives have 
become familiar components of neoliberal reform around the world: central 
bank independence, floating exchange rates, financial sector liberalisation, 
labour market reform and—most importantly for our purposes—trade 
liberalisation and tariff reduction, issues about which Garnaut’s views were 
especially influential.  Indeed, so enthusiastic did Australian policymakers 
become about the merits of trade liberalisation, they played a pivotal role in 
establishing Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a major new 
intergovernmental institution to promote similar reforms across the region.11  
The fact that Australia’s reformist overtures were often met with studied 
indifference in a region that remained sceptical about neoliberalism should 
not blind us to the importance of economic liberalisation in Australia’s overall 
policy orientation.12  
In the last decade, China has replaced Japan as Australia’s principal trade 
partner and most important regional economic relationship.  However, the 
logic of complementarity between a resource-rich Australian economy and 
an industrialising Asian partner still applies.  Sino-Australian ties therefore 
provide an important test of the reform period’s efficacy, and of the merits of 
Australia’s approach to trade relations with the region.  While there may be 
much to be said for many of the reforms undertaken during the 1990s, 
Australia’s economic relationship with China generates vulnerabilities and 
tensions that seem contrary to Australia’s long-term economic—and perhaps 
political—interests.  Why?  Understanding the complications inherent in 
Sino-Australian trade relations can help illuminate the answer. 
‘Deep but Narrow’ Economic Relations 
Given the overwhelming contemporary significance of China to the 
Australian economy, it is easy to forget that bilateral economic relations are 
comparatively young.  Prior to the Whitlam Government’s diplomatic 
recognition of the People’s Republic of China in December 1972, the two 
countries had practically no economic ties of which to speak.  Indeed, 
economics would not come to the fore of the relationship for many years.  
Despite the signing of two major trade agreements in 1973 and 1981,13 
                                                
10 Mark Beeson and Diane Stone, ‘The Changing Fortunes of a Policy Entrepreneur: The Case 
of Ross Garnaut’, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 48, no. 1 (2013), pp. 1-14. 
11 Nick Bisley, ‘APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’, in M. Beeson and R. Stubbs (eds), 
Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 350-63. 
12 Mark Beeson and Iyanatul Islam, ‘Neo-liberalism and East Asia: Resisting the Washington 
Consensus’, Journal of Development Studies, vol. 41, no. 2 (2005), pp. 197-219; Andrew 
Walter, Governing Finance: East Asia’s Adoption of International Standards (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2008). 
13 ‘Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China’, United Nations Treaty Series, vol . 975, no. I-14127 (1973); ‘Protocol on 
Economic Cooperation Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China’, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1368, no. I-23083 (1981). 
Coming to Terms with China:  
Managing Complications in the Sino-Australian Economic Relationship 
 - 25 - 
economic considerations were subordinate to to Cold War security concerns 
for the majority of the 1970s and 1980s.14  Australian aspirations to develop 
China as an economic partner were also constrained by diplomatic issues, 
particularly the 1989 Tiananmen incident and the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.15  
Complementarity between the two economies—with Australian well-
endowed with natural resources, and China emerging as manufacturing 
powerhouse—was simply insufficient to overcome the inhibiting effects of 
geopolitics.  As late as the year 2000, bilateral trade flows were worth $15 
billion, equivalent to a paltry 6.6 per cent of Australia’s total trade.16 
The catalyst for a rapid deepening of Sino-Australian economic ties was the 
‘global resources boom’ of the mid-2000s.  Owing to surging demand from a 
range of industrialising economies—including China, India, Brazil and 
Indonesia—global resource markets began a steady upward climb.17  This 
demand side pressure saw the international price of most minerals and 
energy quadruple between 2005 and 2012.18  At the same time, China was 
entering the ‘heavy’ stage of its industrialisation, driven by the steel, 
construction, machinery and automobile sectors.  With only limited domestic 
reserves of minerals and energy to fuel its industrial sectors, China faced an 
emerging resource security crisis that threatened its overall economic 
development program.19  Australia was ideally placed to take on the role of 
China’s principal resource supplier, given its established and technologically 
advanced mining sector, and close geographic proximity to Chinese markets 
in comparison to competing African and Latin American producers.  Iron 
ore—the principal raw material used in the production of steel—emerged as 
the major focus of this resource trade.  By 2013 Australia was exporting 
some $55 billion worth of iron ore to China, accounting for 52 per cent of the 
country’s import needs.20 
The resource boom provided the underlying driver for a dramatic 
intensification in Sino-Australian trade ties.  In the decade to 2014, bilateral 
trade flows quadrupled to $141 billion annually, with surging Australian 
resource exports flipping the trade balance from deficit to surplus from 2009 
(see Figure 1).  As China surged up the list of trade partners, the geographic 
                                                
14 Stuart Harris, ‘Australia-China Political Relations: From Fear to Friendly Relations?’, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 49, no. 2 (1995), pp. 237-48. 
15 Frank Frost, Directions in China’s Foreign Relations—Implications for East Asia and Australia, 
Parliamentary Library Research Brief, no. 9 (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2005) 
16 Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Trade in Goods and Services Australia April 2015 
(Cat No. 5368.0). 
17 Bernice Lee, Felix Preston, Jaakko Kooroshy, Rob Bailey and Glada Lahn, Resources 
Futures (London: Chatham House, 2012), Chapter 1. 
18 Jeffrey D. Wilson, ‘Regionalising Resource Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Challenge of 
Economic Nationalism’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 2 (2015), pp. 224-
45. 
19 Wilson, Governing Global Production, Chapter 7. 
20 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘UNCTADstat Database’, 
<unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/> [Accessed 8 June 2015]. 
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structure of Australian trade underwent a similar shift.  From an initially 
marginal position in the late 1990s, China became Australia’s number one 
trade partner in 2007, and by 2014 accounted for approximately one-third of 
national exports (Figure 2).  These shifts marked a dramatic reorientation in 
Australia’s foreign economic relations, which had hitherto focused on 
‘traditional’ partners such as the United States, EU, Japan and Korea.  
Expanding trade with China was also fortuitously timed for Australia, closely 
coinciding with the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-09.  Indeed, many 
economists and the then-Treasurer Wayne Swan argued that the booming 
resource trade with China was critical in helping Australia escape the worst 
of the GFC, whose local effects were relatively mild in international 
comparison.21  
Figure 1: Australian Trade with China, 1995-2014 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Trade in Goods and Services Australia 
April 2015 (Cat No. 5368.0).  
Nonetheless, several economic asymmetries mean the burgeoning China 
trade relationship may potentially face future challenges.  Principal amongst 
these is the heavy dependence on a very narrow set of mineral resources.  
As Table 1 reveals, the rapid growth has largely been driven by iron ore (and 
to a lesser extent other minerals), which now collectively account for around 
80 per cent of Australian merchandise exports to China.  Non-mineral 
sectors have under-performed in comparison, to the point that the trade 
relationship might better be labelled an ‘iron ore relationship’.  This biased 
trade does not mirror the structure of the broader Australian economy (in 
                                                
21 Wayne Swan, ‘Resources and Recovery—Speech to Minerals Week 2009, Canberra, 26 May 
2009’, <ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeches/2009/012.htm& 
pageID=005&min=wms&Year=&DocType=> [Accessed 9 June 2015]; Dow Jones, ‘Mining 
Sector Investment to Speed up Recovery from Slowdown’, The Australian, 2 June 2010. 
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which mining accounts for only 9 per cent of gross domestic product).22  This 
indicates that the ‘China boom’ has not impacted on most industrial sectors, 
and offered few opportunities for the broader Australian economy.  
Policymakers have had to manage the problems of a ‘two-speed economy’, 
where rapid (China-driven) growth in resource sectors must be balanced 
against more modest performance in other non-China oriented industries.23  
Iron ore trade with China also posed ‘Dutch disease’-type problems for many 
other export-oriented sectors (particularly agriculture and tourism), whose 
international competitiveness were undermined by a rapid appreciation in the 
Australian dollar between 2008 and 2012.24  While both the mining boom 
and currency have receded since 2013, the episode demonstrated the 
vulnerabilities that dependence on iron ore exports to China have posed. 
Figure 2: Composition of Australian Trade by Partner, 1999-2014 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Trade in Goods and Services Australia 
April 2015 (Cat No. 5368.0).  
Second, there is a discernible pattern of asymmetry in the interdependence 
between the two economies.  In macroeconomic terms, China now accounts 
for around a third of Australia’s trade, and exports to China are alone 
equivalent to 5.7 per cent of GDP.  A significant portion of the Australian 
economy—and the majority of its resource sector—now depends on access 
to what have been buoyant Chinese markets.  But given the size disparities 
between the two countries, Australia’s economic importance to China is far 
less pronounced.  Australia is presently China’s seventh largest trade 
partner, accounts for 3.2 per cent of its trade, and exports to Australia are 
                                                
22 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian National Accounts: National Income Expenditure 
and Product March 2015 (Cat No. 5206.0). 
23 Harry Perlich, ‘Economic Notes: Australia’s Two-Speed Economy’, Journal of Australian 
Political Economy, vol. 72, no. 1 (2013), pp. 106-26. 
24 W. Max Corden, ‘Dutch Disease in Australia: Policy Options for a Three-Speed Economy’, 
Australian Economic Review, vol. 45, no. 3 (2012), pp. 290-304. 
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equivalent to only 0.4 per cent of Chinese GDP.25  While Australia is critically 
important as a supplier of iron ore to the Chinese steel sector,26 in broader 
terms the bilateral economic relationship is of considerably less importance 
to China.  This asymmetry means that Australian policymakers must place a 
greater emphasis on China than vice versa, which can frustrate economic 
diplomacy initiatives.  An instructive example is provided by the negotiations 
for the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA).  Despite being a 
very high Australian trade policy priority, three federal governments took ten 
years and twenty-two rounds of negotiation to complete the agreement in 
2015.  Even then, Chinese unwillingness to meet Australian agricultural 
requests were only overcome by the Abbott Government making the difficult 
choice to exclude several farm sectors from the agreement.27 
Table 1: Composition of Australian Merchandise Exports to China, 2000-13 (USD billions) 
 2000 2005 2010 2013 % growth 2005-13 
Iron ore 0.6 4.3 31.1 51.0 1174% 
Coal 0.1 0.4 4.7 8.8 2167% 
Other minerals 0.7 2.1 7.3 9.3 443% 
Agriculture 0.5 0.5 1.3 3.7 716% 
Others 1.6 4.9 8.0 14.6 299% 
Total merchandise 
exports 3.5 12.2 52.4 87.4 714% 
Minerals % total exports 39.4% 56.0% 82.2% 79.1%  
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘UNCTADStat Database’, 
<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/>.  
A third—and often overlooked—problem is the fact that the development of 
investment ties has lagged well behind trade.  Driven by interest in the 
mining sector, Chinese investment into Australia has grown rapidly in recent 
years, with foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks increasing four-fold to $65 
billion in the five years to 2014.  However, Chinese investors remain minor 
players (accounting for only 2.3 per cent of FDI stocks), and traditional 
partners such as the United States, UK and EU still provide the majority of 
Australia’s foreign capital.28  This investment is also narrowly concentrated, 
with the mining industry accounting for 75 per cent of approved Chinese 
                                                
25 Authors’ calculations, from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
‘UNCTADStat Database’, <unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/> [Accessed 8 June 2015]; United Nations 
Statistical Division, ‘UN Comtrade Database’, <comtrade.un.org/> [Accessed 8 June 2015]. 
26 Jeffrey D. Wilson, ‘Chinese Resource Security Policies and the Restructuring of the Asia-
Pacific Iron Ore Market’, Resource Policy, vol. 37, no. 3 (2012), pp. 331-9. 
27 ‘FTA Relies on Compromise’, The Land, 13 September 2013; Jeffrey D. Wilson, ‘China-
Australia Trade Agreement a Compromised Victory’, The Conversation, 18 June 2015. 
28 Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Investment Position Australia: Supplementary 
Statistics 2014 (Cat. No. 5352.0). 
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investments between 2003-04 and 2012-13.29  One major sticking point has 
been the screening of Chinese investment applications by the Foreign 
Investment Review Board (FIRB), which (rightly or wrongly) is perceived by 
Chinese investors as a form of regulatory discrimination by the Australian 
Government.30  As a consequence, few Australian industries have developed 
meaningful investment ties with China.  As these ties are an important 
element for accessing Chinese consumer markets—particularly in the 
services sector—this puts Australian firms at a relative disadvantage in 
developing new business opportunities.31 
Sino-Australian economic relations might thus be summarised as deep but 
narrow—extensive in volume, but overwhelmingly dominated by a small 
number of resource commodities.  This lack of diversity exposes Australia to 
several economic risks.  A downturn in volatile global resource markets—
such as the one that has hit the iron ore sector since 201432—will rapidly 
decrease the value of Australian exports to China.  The slowing pace of 
China’s industrialisaton, associated with Xi Xinping’s ‘new normal’ economic 
policy of 2014,33 similarly threatens the buoyancy of Chinese resource 
markets on which the bilateral relationship is predicated.  A lack of 
investment ties outside the mining sector also poses challenges for other 
Australian export industries—particularly the tourism, agriculture and 
technical services sectors—to penetrate Chinese markets subject to high 
levels of trade protection.  Thus, while the Sino-Australian economic 
relationship has deepened significantly during the last decade, it remains 
characterised by a range of vulnerabilities that pose asymmetric risks for 
Australia. 
Dealing with State Capitalists? 
The Sino-Australian trade relationship is further complicated by political-
economic differences in the way the two economies are constituted.  
Economic activity now is frequently disaggregated and dispersed across 
national boundaries by independent, footloose corporations that may have 
no obvious national allegiance or identity.34  This is particularly true in the 
resource sectors at the heart of the relationship, which is dominated by two 
multinational mining firms BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto.  BHP Billiton at one 
                                                
29 Authors’ summary, from data in Foreign Investment Review Board Annual Reports (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, various years). 
30John Larum, Chinese Perspectives on Investing in Australia (Sydney: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2011). 
31 First Murdoch Commission, Western Australian and the Evolving Regional Order: Challenges 
and Opportunities (Perth: Murdoch University, 2013), p. 49. 
32 ‘The Latest Iron Ore Price Slump: Causes and Effects’, Forbes, 14 March 2014. 
33 Angang Hu, ‘Embracing China’s “New Normal”’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 3 (2015), pp. 8-
12. 
34 Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the Global Economy, 6th ed. 
(New York: Guilford Press, 2011). 
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time liked to style itself as ‘the big Australian’,35 but now has a complex, 
multinational ownership structure that has overturned any simple identity 
between economic and political space.  Whatever one may think of the 
merits of foreign versus local ownership, firms such as BHP and Rio Tinto 
that are overwhelmingly foreign owned at least have the merit of being 
familiar, profit-oriented, market-driven, independent commercial entities.  No 
such assumptions can be made about the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
that are the principal partners with which resource Australian companies 
must trade.36 
Despite the three decades of economic reform since the announcement of 
the ‘Open Door’ policy in 1978, the Chinese state continues to exert a 
profound influence over the course of economic development.  While this is 
common in many Asian countries,37 in China’s case continuing state control 
over strategically important parts of the economy is essentially part of a 
distinct style of political rule known as ‘state capitalism’.  As Ian Bremmer 
points out, the ultimate motive of state capitalism 
is not economic (maximising growth) but political (maximising the state’s 
power and the leadership’s chances of survival).  This is a form of capitalism 
but one in which the state acts as the dominant economic player and uses 
markets primarily for political gain.38   
In the context of authoritarian China, in which the state’s legitimacy and the 
authority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is almost entirely 
dependent on its ability to deliver continuing economic growth,39 this means 
that SOEs have assumed a critical role.  Control of strategic economic 
activities through SOEs has assumed an existential importance, reflected in 
the Chinese state’s ‘Going Out’ program and financial commitments to the 
internationalisation of state-owned resource companies and sovereign 
wealth funds.40 
Far from abandoning state control, Chinese economic planners are actually 
attempting to develop ‘national champions’ in strategic sectors such as oil, 
                                                
35 Alan Trengove, ‘What’s Good for Australia...!’ The Story of BHP (Stanmore: Cassell Australia, 
1975). 
36 For example, the Chinese steel sector is dominated by a group of ‘national champion’ SOEs.  
In recent years, the Chinese Government has attempted to organise these SOEs into a ‘buyer’s 
cartel’ that can exercise influence in iron ore price negotiations.  See Wilson, ‘Chinese Resource 
Security Policies’, pp. 335-7. 
37 Richard Stubbs, 'What Ever Happened to the East Asian Developmental State? The 
Unfolding Debate', The Pacific Review, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 1-22. 
38 Ian Bremmer, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and 
Corporations? (New York: Penguin, 2010), p. 5 (emphasis in original). 
39 Yuchao Zhu, ‘“Performance Legitimacy” and China’s Political Adaptation Strategy’, Journal of 
Chinese Political Science, vol. 16, no. 2 (2011), pp. 123-40. 
40 Nargiza Salidjanova, Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(Washington, DC: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011). 
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mining, steel and banking.41  Recent analysis by Szamosszegi and Kyle 
estimates that state-owned enterprises and their holding companies account 
for approximately 40 per cent of China’s GDP.42  More importantly, their 
exhaustive analysis of the SOE sector concluded that:  
SOE investments and actions also reflect the long-term vision of their 
controlling shareholder (the Chinese government), and thus short-term 
profits are not necessarily their highest priority … The top Chinese 
leadership has stated that SOEs will continue to be the main actors in 
China’s going out policy, and that China will use its massive foreign 
exchange reserves to fuel this overseas expansion, especially targeting 
energy and natural resources.43  
This state-led strategy has plainly been in evidence in Australia, where the 
investment efforts of Chinese SOEs have three inter-related goals.  First, the 
Chinese Government hopes to use (state-subsidised) investment to increase 
the supply of minerals to China,44 potentially lowering the world prices driving 
its soaring resource import costs.  Second, it also intends to gain a strategic 
foothold in world resource markets, by developing ‘captive mines’ owned and 
controlled by Chinese corporations.45  Third, it has also aimed to dilute the 
strength of the so-called ‘Big-3’ mining companies—BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, 
and Brazil’s Vale—which the Chinese Government has accused of being 
‘monopolists’ that have artificially inflated global iron ore prices.46  In other 
words, the arrival of Chinese SOEs in the Australian mining sector has not 
been driven purely by profitability motives, but also by the strategic economic 
objectives of the Chinese state. 
The Australian Government is increasingly attentive to the possible impact of 
Chinese investment, and is more alert than its predecessors were about a 
similar Japanese strategy in the 1970s and 1980s.47  The FIRB, which is 
charged with ensuring that investments are in the ‘national interest’, has 
recently become concerned about the possible strategic implications of 
Chinese resource investment.  Former Treasurer Wayne Swan provided the 
FIRB with new guidelines for screening SOE investments in 2008,48 which 
the head of the FIRB described as “a stricter policy aimed squarely at 
China's growing influence in Australia's resources sector”.49  While the 
current Abbott Government has attempted to position itself as ‘open for 
                                                
41 Yi-Chong Xu (ed.), The Political Economy of State-owned Enterprises in China and India 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
42 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State 
Capitalism in China (Washington, DC: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
2011), p. 21.  
43 Ibid., p. 89. 
44 Junsai Zhang, ‘China Seeks to Invest, not Dominate’, The Australian, 2 April 2009. 
45 Wilson, ‘Chinese Resource Security Policies’, p. 334. 
46 ‘Iron Ore Monopoly May End by 2015’, China Daily, 25 March 2011. 
47 On the latter, see Wilson, Governing Global Production, Chapters 4-6. 
48 Department of Treasury (Australia), Summary of Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 2008). 
49 Philip Dorling, ‘Labor’s Secret Curb on China’, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 March 2011. 
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business’, it has found itself coming under direct Chinese pressure to 
introduce a less intrusive, more even-handed policy regime as evidence of 
this approach.50  FIRB screening was a key issue in negotiations for the 
ChAFTA agreement, whose investment chapter has subsequently and 
revealingly raised FIRB screening thresholds for private—but not state-
owned—Chinese investors.51 
Perhaps no incident better highlighted this tension than Chinese state-owned 
company Chinalco’s abortive bid for a stake in Rio Tinto.  Following its 
takeover of Canadian aluminum producer Alcan, a heavily-indebted Rio 
Tinto invited Chinalco to invest in the company in order to save it from a 
possible hostile takeover from BHP Billiton.  Despite Chinalco’s enthusiastic 
response, Rio Tinto withdrew from the deal in June 2009 in the face of 
considerable public consternation, regulatory hand-wringing, intense 
diplomatic lobbying and opposition from some Rio Tinto shareholders.52  
While the deal collapsed due to a combination of regulatory and investor 
concerns, Chinalco and Chinese observers more generally were convinced it 
had been killed off following the undisclosed intervention of the Australian 
Government and FIRB.  As Jennifer Hewett points out, whatever the ultimate 
cause “the basic message [received in China] was that Australia was 
concerned about the prospect of China, a leading customer of its resources, 
having too much influence or control over those resources”.53  Nonetheless, 
the belief that national economic interests would be better served by a 
resource sector controlled by multinational mining firms would soon be 
shattered by the sector’s response to proposed changes to fiscal policy. 
Australia and the Resource Curse 
It is usually assumed that the perils of the ‘resource curse’ are primarily 
associated with developing economies such as Sierra Leone or Middle 
Eastern authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia.54  In these and similar 
cases, the importance of a single commodity can distort economic 
development and consolidate the political position of any group that is able 
to control its production and the wealth it generates to consolidate its power.  
Through patronage and rent-seeking activities, privileged insiders and the 
politically powerful can use their access to resource-generated wealth to 
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entrench the position of what are invariably non-democratic, repressive 
regimes.55  
For developed economies and democratic polities such as Australia, the 
resource curse might seem irrelevant.  However, the structure of Australia’s 
economy has been profoundly influenced by the growth of the resource 
sector.  As in less developed economies, currency appreciation has had an 
adverse impact on other trade-exposed industries, especially manufacturing, 
agriculture and traded services (such as tourism).56  While concerns about 
the negative impact of high resource prices and currency appreciation on 
Australian industry first emerged during the Japan-driven boom of the 
1970s,57 these had subsided in intervening years as mining fell from 
economic prominence.  But as the Sino-Australian resource relationship 
gathered pace in the mid-2000s, these issues returned to the forefront of the 
national economic policy agenda.  Indeed, Australia’s trade profile shift 
towards mineral exports has made the economy as a whole much more 
vulnerable to commodity prices, which are notoriously volatile and now 
increasingly dependent on dynamics in the Chinese economy. 
What is also becoming apparent is that the mining sector’s power is not 
confined to its economic influence.  Increasingly, the mining sector is 
exerting a political influence that reminds us that the possible consequences 
of the resource curse are not confined to the developing world.  An 
underlying structural reality is the fact that the ‘Australian’ resource sector is 
overwhelmingly foreign owned.  Decisions about investment and production 
are generally made by multinational corporations driven by a global 
organisational logic that may be at odds with the ostensible ‘national 
interest’.  The growing economic and political significance of the resource 
sector has in large part been driven by the fact it drives the burgeoning Sino-
Australian trade relationship, which has enabled it to influence government 
policy in ways that reflect corporate interests.  This possibility was 
dramatically highlighted in the intense political struggle that emerged over 
tax policy during the administration of Kevin Rudd.  
The mining lobby collectively underwrote a highly effective campaign to 
oppose the Rudd Government’s proposed Resource Super Profits Tax 
(RSPT).  The tax proved extremely controversial, was stridently opposed by 
the mining sector and the then-opposition Liberal-National coalition, and led 
to an ‘advertising war’ between the federal Labor Government and industry.  
Following Kevin Rudd’s removal from the prime ministership in June 2010, 
the Gillard Government reformed the proposal as the newly named Minerals 
Rent Resource Tax (MRRT).  However, even this watered-down package 
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remained contested, and became one of the key issues contributing to the 
success of the Coalition in the September 2013 federal election.  The MRRT 
also proved very short lived, only taking effect in the 2012-13 financial year 
before being repealed by the Abbott Government in September 2014.  By 
investing $22 million in a high profile advertising blitz, the mining sector was 
able to save an estimated $60 billion in taxation revenues that the RSPT 
would have raised over ten years.58  As Paul Cleary points out, 
The success of multinational miners in securing these concessions, and in 
beating voters to the punch, reveals the perverse world order in which we 
live: an advanced country can possess enormous riches but lack the 
capacity to do what is clearly in its own long-term interest.59 
The inability of a democratically elected government to compete with the 
financial firepower and political skills of a powerful set of vested interests is 
revealing and troubling.  But of even greater concern was the fact that the 
mining lobby’s highly successful campaign was instrumental in bringing 
about the downfall of Australia’s then prime minister.  True, Kevin Rudd had 
famously alienated many within in his own party, and was highly dependent 
on his public popularity to maintain authority within a notoriously faction-
ridden, tribal and brutal party machine.60  However, the mining industry had 
clearly emerged as an exceptionally powerful lobby group, capable of 
exercising considerable—and ultimately decisive—discursive influence over 
national policy debates.61  The fact that this industry was overwhelmingly 
foreign-owned, and its political centrality was a consequence of growing (but 
asymmetric) trade ties with China, only adds to the perception that 
Australia’s political and economic independence have become somewhat 
compromised. 
The Geopolitics of Trade 
If these economic and political issues in Sino-Australian relations were not 
enough, geopolitics has further complicated policymaking.  This should not 
surprise us.  One of the big lessons of the entire East Asian developmental 
experience, of which China is now such an important part, is that politics, 
economics and security are intimately entwined.  It is simply not possible to 
understand the course of the post-war economic ‘miracle’ in East Asia, for 
example, without considering the wider geopolitical context within which it 
occurred.62  Moreover, for many East Asian states, economic development 
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remains the core of a more encompassing view of national security.63  This 
has major implications not just for the way many Asian states organise their 
economies and political relations, but for their trading partners, too.  Unless 
such differences are recognised and understood, Australian policy will be 
incapable of grasping opportunities or responding to potential threats, 
especially to economic rather than more traditional forms of security. 
Trade relations and economic interdependence cannot be understood in 
isolation.  Australia’s trade with China occurs within a complex strategic 
overlay and, as many commentators have noted, Australia’s largest 
economic partner and principal strategic ally are geopolitical rivals.64  At least 
when Japan was Australia’s largest trade partner, they were both in the 
same ideological and strategic camp.  Now Australian policymakers need to 
manage two pivotally important relationships at a time of rapid change in 
their own relative standing.  The simple material reality is that no matter how 
much cultural and historical affinity may exist between Australian and 
American people, China’s economy is exerting an irresistible gravitational 
pull that is reshaping the Australian economy and making the calculation of 
the national interest increasingly problematic.  Choices currently facing 
Australian trade policy perfectly illustrate this dilemma. 
Two new ‘mega-regional’ trade agreements are presently under negotiation 
in the Asia-Pacific: the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the 
ASEAN-led but China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) agreement.  The agreements are competing proposals, 
differentiated by membership and level of ambition for trade liberalisation.  
Their competition is also a proxy for US-China rivalry, with the United States 
a member of the TPP but not the RCEP (and China vice versa).  Australia is 
presently one of a handful of countries that is a party to both negotiations, 
and must decide how (finite) political capital and diplomatic resources are 
divided between the initiatives.65  While trade policy interests might normally 
be expected to be at the forefront of such decisions, it is impossible to 
disentangle these from geopolitical concerns.  For the United States, the 
TPP constitutes the economic wing of its recently announced ‘Pivot to Asia’ 
strategy; while some voices in China have argued it is an attempt to 
economically ‘contain’ China by dictating the terms of regional trade 
liberalisation.66  For Australia—and indeed, the other six countries party to 
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both TPP and RCEP negotiations—the risk exists that privileging one trade 
agreement over the other will implicitly (and perhaps unintentionally) signal 
geopolitical choices between the United States and China. 
Given this backdrop, the decision to name China as a strategic threat in the 
Rudd Government’s 2009 Defence White Paper, and the more recent 
commitment to establish a continuing American military presence in Darwin, 
assume even greater significance.  Both of these decisions were plainly 
intended to send a powerful message about Australia’s strategic priorities 
and its concern about how the ‘rise of China’ is viewed in Australia.67  
Whatever the merits of this strategic calculus, there is an implicit judgement 
that this is a call Australians can and ought to make without incurring major 
costs.  And yet such a position ignores the growing asymmetries and biases 
in Australia’s relationship with China, and China’s increased ability to push 
back.  True, China needs Australian resources, but the Australian economy 
is now structurally dependent on narrow economic ties with China that are 
extremely vulnerable to exogenous shocks.  Moreover, it would hardly be 
surprising if Australia’s recent security policy moves accelerate Chinese 
efforts to enhance their own economic security and independence, and to 
capitalise on its existing primacy in the bilateral economic relationship.68  
Conclusion 
What does this array of economic complications mean for Australia’s 
relations with China, and indeed the Asian region more broadly, in coming 
years?  Two major implications stand out.  First, they demonstrate that Sino-
Australian economic relations themselves contain problematic tendencies.  
Narrow trade ties are posing new vulnerabilities for the Australian economy, 
while the complications of Chinese state capitalism make the relationship 
hard to broaden and diversify.  Moreover, the reconfiguration of political-
economic forces in Australia is changing the policymaking calculus within the 
country, while asymmetries in Sino-Australian trade ties have intensified 
Chinese influence from without.  Coming to terms with China consequently 
means more than simply prudently navigating security tensions to ensure 
mutually beneficial economic integration can proceed smoothly.  Problems 
within the economic relationship will require their own management 
strategies, and with China now Australia’s number one trade partner the 
stakes have never been higher.  Australian policymakers will be committing 
a dangerous error if they assume that economic relations with China are 
unproblematically positive on their own terms, or do not pose difficult 
choices. 
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Second, these economic complications mean that Australian policymakers 
will need to think creatively about how economic and security issues are 
balanced on the foreign policy agenda.  The continuing primacy attached to 
more traditional forms of security by Australian policymakers is striking, but 
entirely in keeping with long-established tradition.  Australian policymakers 
have always looked to ‘great and powerful friends’ to underwrite their 
security and recent events confirm that they still do.  The question is 
whether, in an age of greater interdependence, when the likelihood of 
conventional inter-state war has declined, and when Australia has no real 
capacity to influence the outcome of such conflicts even if they were to 
occur, such high profile strategic initiatives are either necessary or 
productive.  We think not.  On the contrary, we think that if Australia is to 
play the sort of constructive ‘middle power’ role that recent governments 
have rhetorically championed, which suggests that Australia ought to play a 
more prominent, independent role as a broker of new ideas and policies, it 
could do so more effectively as an exemplar of a successful ‘trading state’.69  
This would involve a shift in policy priorities that more accurately reflected 
Australia’s weaknesses as well as its possible strengths.  A more realistic 
understanding of the nature of its principal trading relationship and its impact 
on domestic economic and politics might be a good place to start.  This is, 
after all, an arena in which Australian policymakers might realistically and 
legitimately expect to exert influence, and where their efforts might be more 
usefully directed. 
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